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Articles
REFORMING THE CRIMINAL LAW: UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE SCHOOL OF
LAW GROUP GOES TO ANNAPOLIS
By Lynn McLain l

I. The Law is Ever Evolving

Law students arrive at the beginning oftheir first year,
expecting to "learn the law." They may naively think of
the law as a body of information they must commit to
memory.
Law students quickly learn, however, that "studying
law" is a more apt phrase for what will be a lifelong undertaking. The law can never be "learned" in the sense of
being memorized. Bits and pieces - some of its basic
building blocks - can and should be committed to memory. But most important ofthese are the skills of (1) finding the law applicable to a given problem (which in turn
necessitates both analysis that results in asking the right
questions and then searching all the appropriate places
for the possible arswe-.;:) (2) analyzing that law, and analogizing and synthesizing it to and with related legal authority, and (3) finally, expressing one's reasoning and conclusions clearly, both orally and in writing.
Memorizing all of "the law" is impossible for two
reasons. First, there is just too much law out there for any
one person to memorize. This remains true even if one
concentrates on a limited field, such as criminal law, family
law, environmental law, trusts and estates, real property
law, copyright law, patent law, bankruptcy law, trademark
law, or tax law. Secondly, the law is ever evolving. Federal, state, and local agencies make new rulings and adopt
new regulations; federal and state legislatures and town
councils adopt new statutes and ordinances; executives
issue executive orders; and courts all across the country
(leaving aside, for a moment, intemationallaw) issue new
opinions daily.
Law school is merely a three-to-fouryear concentrated introduction to the study oflaw, which will become
a lifetime avocation for all lawyers. Like most things in
life, there are plusses and minuses to this fact. On the plus
side, because the law is never finished, it need not remain
the same. We can make an effort to reform it when we
discern a need for improvement.
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II. Law Students Can Achieve Law Reform

The recognition that we may change the law for the
better presents both a daunting and empowering challenge.
University ofBaltimore School ofLaw faculty, alumni, and
students routinely take up this challenge on local, state,
national, and international fronts.
Recognition ofmy students' power to reform the law
was brought home to several of my Evidence students in
late fall 2001. In the midst of a section of the course
focusing on character evidence in general, we whitewater
rafted at a dizzying speed through the federal rape shield
law, Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 412, and its Maryland state counterpart. 2 I mentioned a recent decision of
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland that, in my
mind, pointed out the need to amend the Maryland statute, and asked that interested students contact me after
the end of the semester ifthey wanted to pursue the challenge.
This article will first provide some background regarding rape shield laws in general and the Maryland statute. It then will chronicle my students' and my successful
efforts over the 2002 and 2003 legislative sessions to reform Maryland criminal and evidence law by legislatively
overruling two Maryland appellate cases: Churchfield v.
State,3 which held that the state rape shield law did not
protect victims when the defendant was being tried for
sexual child abuse, and Cooksey v. State,4 which held
that Maryland recognizes no crime of continuing sexual
offense against a child other than the rather narrowly applicable crime of child abuse. 5
III. The Rape Shield Laws in General

Both the Maryland rape shield statute and FRE 412
were adopted in the 1970s (19766 and 1978,1 respectively) in a national wave oflaw reform achieved by "the
women's movement." Studies show that rape was8 (and,
unfortunately, remains)9 a vastly under-reported and, thus,
under prosecuted crime.
The 1970s reform was aimed at protecting rape vic-
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tims from intimidation caused by having to face public humiliation and harassment during cross-examination as to
any consensual sex the victims might have had at anytime
in their lives, with anyone other than the defendant. 10 These
excoriating cross-examinations became known as "the
second rape upon the witness stand. "11 Prior to the adoption of the rape shield laws, many victims who reported
rape declined to go forward with the prosecution oftheir
assailants because the victims feared the ordeal of such
brutal cross-examinations.
The common-law theory of relevance - which, to
many modem ears, no doubt seems so outdated as to be
quaint - ofthis line of questioning was twofold. First, in
every case in which a woman complained of a sexual assault, her reputation as a previously unchaste woman was
admissible to impeach her credibility by showing that she
possessed a character that made her unworthy ofb~lief. ~2
Secondly, if consent were raised as a defense, thIS eVIdence was admissible as substantive evidence to help
prove consent. 13 The underlying logic was that if the victim consented to sexual activity with one person (e.g., her
boyfriend or her fiance) it increased the likelihood that sh.e
consented to sex with the defendant (no matter whether It
was acquaintance "date rape" or dragged-by-a-strangerinto-an-alley-rape). The fact that the victim was a "fallen
woman" who had had premarital or extramarital sex was
provable both by character witnesses who gave repu~a
tion or opinion evidence as to the victim's lack of chastIty
and, in some jurisdictions, by questioning the victim about
specific instances ofher prior sexual conduct. 14
The legislators' response to the women's movement's
outrage to this line of questioning was to pass "rape shield
laws." Under these statutes and rules, evidence of the
victim's reputation for chastity or lack ofchastity is generally wholly inadmissible (unless the prosecution or victim
puts it in controversy),15 as is another witness's opinion
testimony regarding the victim's character for chastity. 16
Evidence of specific instances ofthe victim's prior sexual
conduct is sharply curtailed.
Rape shield laws generally provide that a victim's
sexual activity with someone other than the defendant is
inadmissible to prove consent to sex with the defendant. 17
The only evidence of prior sex that is admissible on the
issue of consent is evidence of prior instances of consensual sex between the victim and the defendant. 18

sent, evidence of specific instances ofthe victim's sexual
conduct, other than with the defendant, may be admissible under the rape shield laws, but only if shown in a
pretrial hearing to have special relevance to the pending
case. 19 For example, the rape shield laws do not per se
preclude the defendant from offering evidence of the
victim's sex with another person if it resulted in physical
evidence that has been entered against the defendant or
was found at the time ofthe charged crime, such as semen, or evidence of physical injury.20 To a large extent,
however, the tremendous advance of DNA technology
makes much of this kind of use of evidence of other sex
obsolete. 21
FRE 412 contains an intentionally vague safety valve
permitting the admission of evidence ofthe victim's sex
.with others when its admission is mandated by "the constitutional rights ofthe defendant" (i. e., the accused's right
to confrontation).22 The Maryland statute guarantees that
same protection but uses more helpful language. The
Maryland statute provides that evidence that gives the victim a motive to falsely accuse the defendant will be admitted. 23
The Maryland statute provides:
Evidence ofa specific instance ofa victim's prior
sexual conduct may be admitted ... only if the
judge finds that (1) the evidence is relevant;
(2) the evidence is material to a fact in issue in the
case; (3) the inflammatory or prejudicial nature of
the evidence does not outweigh its probative value;
and (4) the evidence is:
(i) ofthe victim's past sexual conduct with
the defendant;
ii) isofaspecificinstanceofsexualactivity
showing the source or origin of semen,
pregnancy, disease, or trauma;
(iii) supports a claim thatthe victim has an
ulterior motive in accusing the defendant
ofthe crime; or
(iv) is offered for the purpose of
impeachment afterthe prosecutor has put
the victim's prior sexual conduct inissue.24
Both federal and state laws require that the defendant provide pretrial notice of his or her intent to offer
34.1 U. Bait. L.F. 3
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evidence ofspecific instances ofthe victim's sexual activities. 25 The trial judge, in an in camera (closed) hearing,
must evaluate the probative value of such evidence against
the risk of unfair prejudice to the victim, confusion and
misleading ofthe jmy, and undue consmnption oftrial time.26
The judge generally must rule pretrial whether the
evidence will be permitted. 27 The requirement of a pretrial ruling prevents sneak: attacks on a victim. Ifthe judge
rules pretrial that the evidence will not be permitted, defense counsel cannot delve into it at trial. Ifthe judge rules
that the evidence will be permitted, the victim may reevaluate whether she wishes to proceed. The victim also
can appeal that interlocutory ruling, because forcing the
victim to wait until after the objectionable evidence comes
out at trial would provide the victim with no meaningful
protection if the trial judge was incorrect. Ifthe appellate
court finds the trial judge erred, the victim will be protected at trial.

IV, The Evolution of Maryland's Rape Shield
Statute Pre-Churchfield
As passed in 1976, Maryland's rape shield statute
provided that it would apply in cases offirst- or seconddegree rape. Rape is defined under Maryland criminal
law as involving penetration of the vagina. 28 The initial
rape shield law, therefore, responded to the need to protect female rape victims from being dragged through the
mud by irrelevant cross-examination. The Legislature was
responding logically to the identified problem: defendants
were unfairly intimidating rape victims by (1) routinelyoffering reputation or opinion evidence as to the victims'
lack of prior chastity and by (2) raising consent as a defense and then harassing and humiliating victims by questioning them about their other unrelated sexual experiences,
which were not in fact probative of consent with the defendant.
But the limited coverage of the rape shield statute
necessitated its repeated amendment as it became clear
this defense tactic could be used unfairly in the context of
other charged sex crimes as to which consent was a defense. 29 In the flurry of piecemeal responses to that problem, the second implicit purpose of the initial law, rejecting the common-law precept that a female who had had
sex other than in marriage was unworthy of belief, became obfuscated.
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The bills that we proposed in 2002 and 2003, and
the one that ultimately passed in 2003, addressed both of
these problems, so as to put a stop to the use of such
information to impeach a female's credibility and to preclude the need for further piecemeal amendment. The
bills also extended the scope of Maryland's "rape shield
law" to provide equal protection for male and female victims of sex crimes.

A. Credibility: The Second Tine ofthe
Common-Law Fork
Maryland's 1976 rape shield statute responded most
obviously to the outrage voiced over the notion that a
woman's consensual sex with one man prior to or outside
marriage somehow helped to prove that she consented to
sex with any other man. Yet it also implicitly responded to
another, at least equally perfidious common-law doctrine:
that such a "fallen woman" was unworthy of belief when
she testified under oath.
The common law permitted character evidence as
to a woman's lack of chastity for these two purposes,
consent and credibility, in two ways:
(l) Testimony by character witnesses as to the
woman's reputation in the community for lack of chastity30 (later expanded by statute to permit opinion testimony' as well),3J and
(2) Proof of specific instances ofthe woman's sexual
conduct other than that pertinent to the charged crime, by
questioning the woman herself and, perhaps, by extrinsic
evidence as well.32
The great evidence scholar Dean Wigmore happily
embraced this unashamedly sexist doctrine. He wrote, in
1940:
There is ... at least one situation in which
chastity may have a direct connection with
veracity, viz. when a woman or young girl
testifies as complainant against a man
charged with a sexual crime, - rape,
rape under age, seduction, assault.
MocJem psychiatrists have amplystudied the
behavior of errant young girls and women
coming before the courts in all sorts ofcases.
Their psychic complexes are multifarious,
distorted partly by inherent defects, partly
by diseased derangements or abnormal
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instincts, partly by bad social environment,
partly by temporary physiological or
emotional conditions. One fonn taken by
these complexes is that ofcontriving false
charges of sexual offences by men. The
unchaste (let us call it) mentality finds
incidental but direct expression in the
narrationofimaginmysex-incidentsofwhich
the narrator is the heroine or the victim.

***

No judge should ever let a sex-offense
charge go to the jury unless the female
complainant's social history and mental
makeup have been examined and
testified to by a qualified physician. 33

Wigmore advocated that rules ofevidence "must be
modified or interpreted to pennit the woman's character as to chastity to be considered, inasmuch as this trait
may be inextricably connected with a tendency to
unveracity in charges ofsex o.ffences."34
Maryland's General Assembly rejected this line of
thinking in two ways in 1976, when it passed the State's
first rape shield law. First, it excluded reputation and opinion evidence as to a rape victim's chastity altogether. Second, it restricted evidence of specific instances of the
victim's other sexual experiences to those having specific
relevance. One of these permissible categories listed in
the statute goes directly to the victim's credibility: "Evidence which supports a claim that the victim has an ulterior motive in accusing the defendant ofthe crime .... "35
TIlls provision was not intended to un-do the statute's
trumping ofthe common law, which had permitted such
evidence de rigeur in every case. Rather, it was intended
(and subsequently construed) to permit such evidence only
when it was highly relevant, in that it provided a specific
motive to falsely charge rape. In 1976, the classic hypothetical example ofwhen this provision would apply was
when an unmarried female had become pregnant as a result of consensual sex with her lover; wanting to cover up
that fact, she falsely cried rape by another person, the
defendant. 36 Today, the child's patemitycould be readily
determined.

B. Piecemeal Extension ofthe Crimes Covered
In 1977, only one year after the initial passage of the
rape shield statute, the General Assembly realized that the
statute was under-inclusive, and amended it to apply also
in prosecutions for commission of any "sexual offense in
the first or second degree. "37 Sexual offense in either the
first38 or the second39 degree includes engaging in any of
various sexual acts with another, other than vaginal intercourse: cunnilingus, fellatio, analingus, or anal intercourse.40
The rationale for the rape shield law's application to rape
applied equally when other sexual offenses were charged.
The statute, however, remained under-inclusive. In
1997, it was again amended to explicitly include prosecutions for attempted rape in the first or second degree and
attempted sexual offenses in the first or second degree. 41
The evidence ofthe victim's prior chastity or lack thereof
was, of course, no more probative in such cases than it
was in cases for the accomplished rape or sexual offense.
Over the years, the courts faced the questions of
how to treat the rape shield law if (1) a crime listed in the
statute was being prosecuted along with lesser included
crimes or (2) only a lesser included crime was being prosecuted.
V. Case Law Pre-Churchfield as to Lesser
Included Offenses
The Court of Special Appeals quickly discerned that
the rape shield law would be entirely foiled if it were held
to apply only to the prosecution of a crime listed in the
staMe, and not to the prosecution oflesser included crimes
also being prosecuted in the same trial. In a first -degree
rape case, for example, lesser included crimes could include second-degree rape, sexual offense in the first, second, third, or fourth degree, child sexual abuse, sexual
abuse of a vulnerable adult, incest, sodomy, and simple
assault, as well as attempts at a number of these crimes.42
The Court ofAppeals thus held, in Davenport v. State,43
that the statute also applied to lesser included offenses in
a trial for one or more of the offenses enumerated in the
statute.
Ten years later, on April 2, 200 1, in Churchfield v.
State,44 the Court of Special Appeals declined to extend
this holding to the situation when only a lesser included
offense was charged. The Churchfield case had proceeded to trial only on the charge of sexual child abuse.

34.1 U. Bait. L.F. 5
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VI. Churchfield
In Churchjield, the Court of Special Appeals not
only held the rape shield statute inapplicable where the
trial was for sexual child abuse, it returned to the antiquated Wigmore approach that the female victim's lack of
chastity was probative of her lack oftruthfulness.

A. Background Facts
Christina, the victim in Churchfield, was the daughter of the defendant and his second wife. Christina was
ten years of age when she was removed from her drugaddicted mother's home in Florida and sentto live with
her father and his third wife in Wicomico County, Maryland. 4s After some time, her adult half-brother (born to
her father and his first wife) came to live there alsO. 46 Her
half-brother impregnated Christina when she was twelve.47
Christina gave birth to a baby, who was given to another
relative to raise in another state. 48
A couple ofyears later, Christina ran away from home
to live with a boyfriend's family.49 At that time, she confided to the boyfriend's mother that her father had been
having sexual intercourse with her.so The boyfriend's
mother reported the matter. 51 Social services investigated, 52 and a Wicomico County Assistant State's Attorney, Angela Di Pietro,53 prosecuted the father.

B. The Charges: Cooksey's Effect
Initially, Ms. Di Pietro charged Christina's father with
second-degree rape, incest, and second-degree assault,
as well as sexual child abuse, all continuing over a certain
period of time. 54 Like most child victims, Christina apparently did not remember the specific dates that each
sexual act occurred. The Court ofAppeals' June 2000
decision in Cooksey v. State intervened 55
In Cooksey, the child victim, and thus the State, was
not able to state precisely when the sexual acts occurred. 56
Cooksey was indicted and charged for committing, inter
alia, second- and third-degree sexual offenses by, respectively, performing cunnilingus on a child under the age of
fourteen, when Cooksey was four or more years older
than the child, and by engaging in various other specified
sexual contacts with the child, continuously ''up to fifteen
times" over the period of a year. 57 The Court ofAppeals
held that Maryland recognizes no crime ofcontinuing sexual
34.1 U. Bait L.F. 6

offense other than sexual child abuse, so that Cooksey's
indictment had to be dismissed. 58 Cooksey held that
Maryland law required that such allegations be charged
individually for each particular occurrence.
The Court ofAppeals held that, of sexual offense
crimes, only the crime of sexual child abuse could be
charged as a crime continuing over a period of time. 59 It
let stand a count for sexual child abuse of the same child
for that conduct "up to fifteen times" over a period of a
year, as well as a count of sexual abuse against another
child under the age of eighteen, between 75 and 100 times
over a three-year period. 60
In light of the Cooksey decision, the Wicomico
County State's Attorney's office nolle prossed the second-degree rape, incest, and second-degree assault
charges against Christina's father and went to trial only on
the charge of sexual child abuse. 61

C. The Trial
At the time oftrial, Christina was fifteen years 01d. 62
She testified for the State and was extensively cross-examined by defense counse1. 63 The defense was permitted
to bring out the fact that Christina had a baby when she
was twelve and to try to show that she was angry with her
father for having made her give up the baby.64 The defense also wanted to question Christina as to whether she
was, at age fifteen, having sex with two teenaged boymends. 65 The trial judge, the Honorable Donald C. Davis,
sustained the prosecution's objection. 66
Judge Davis ruled that the defense was free to question Christina, and offer others' testimony, about alleged
conflicts between father and daughter regarding curfew
and other disciplinary matters. 67 Indeed, the defense did
so not only in its questioning of Christina, but also in presenting testimony both by the defendant and by Christina's
stepmother. The father testified that he had disciplinary
problems with Christina including "clashes" over her manner
of dress, wearing make-up, and dating. 68 The father also
admitted, that upon his arrest, he stated, "'I'll take care of
that bitch when this is over. "'69 The stepmother testified
that Christina was a liar and a manipulator. 7o
Such evidence supported the defense's theory that
Christina fabricated the rape claim to "get back" at her
father for having taken the baby away and for imposing
disciplinary rules. 71 But Judge Davis ruled that the de-
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fense could not go into whether she was having sex with
boys her age.72
In the opinion of the author, Judge Davis ruled correctlyunder Maryland Rules 5-403 73 and5-611(a).74 The
jury could well understand the defense's allegation that an
out-of-control teenager resented her father's restrictive
rules. The fact that Christina was allegedly having sex
with teenaged boys added no substantial probative value
to her alleged motive to falsely claim rape by her father;
going into this matter would result in unfair embarrassment of and prejudice to her, distraction ofthe jurors from
the issues in the case, and undue consumption of court
time.
Moreover, there was no risk the jury would conclude that Christina's ability to describe the physical act of
sexual intercourse necessarily meant that she had had intercourse with her father. The jury had heard testimony
that she had been impregnated, several years before, by
her adult half-brother and had given birth to a child. 75 In
addition, the defendant had also managed to testify that
Christina ''used to brag about having sexual intercourse,"
before the prosecutor's objection was sustained. 76
Having heard the sharply conflicting testimony, the
jury apparently believed Christina and disbelieved her father; the jury found the father guilty. He was sentenced to
fifteen years imprisonment. 77

D. Reversal and Remand
On appeal, his conviction was reversed. In a decision shocking to this author, a unanimous panel ofthe Court
of Special Appeals (Judge Raymond G. lbieme, Jr. (retired), joined by Judge John J. Bishop (retired) and Judge
Peter Kmuser) held that Judge Davis's ruling precluding
inquiry into Christina's sexual activities with her alleged
two boyfriends was an abuse of discretion, constituting
reversible error.78 Moreover, although an appellate court's
role is not to second-guess ajury's findings as to credibility,79 the panel appeared to do just that. Judge lbieme,
writing for the court, appeared to fully credit the father's
testimony; Judge lbieme asserted, "Christina accused her
father of the very activity from which he sought to protect her .... "80
The Court of Special Appeals remanded the case
for a new trial. As Ms. Di Pietro prepared to go to trial
again, the father pled guilty in exchange for a lesser sen-

tence (4~ years imprisonment, 1112 years probation).81
He will remain a registered sex offender. 82
Christina, who was sent to live in a group foster home
in Baltimore, is in the process of being adopted by another family.83

E. Churchjield's Holding as to the Rape Shield
Law
The Court of Special Appeals held in Churchfield
that because trial proceeded only on sexual child abuse, a
crime not listed in the rape shield statute, the rape shield
law's protection was unavailable. 84 The underlying act
charged was the same vaginal intercourse as occurs in
first-or second-degree rape. 85 Thus, Christina, a minor
victim, lacked the protection that an adult rape victim would
have had under the rape shield law. As the students argued in their subsequent written testimony before the
House Judiciary Committee and the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, the Churchfield status quo resulted
in Maryland's giving the least protection to those most
vulnerable and most in need of the shelter offered by the
rape shield statute. 86
F. The Court of Special Appeals' Theory of

Relevance
The rape shield law did not exclude the evidence
proffered by the defense in the Churchfieldtrial because
the defendant was prosecuted only for sexual child abuse.
But in order for exclusion of the evidence to be error, it
had to have been otherwise admissible. In order to be
admissible, it had to meet the threshold requirement for
any evidence: relevance to an issue in the case. 87
Consent is not a defense to sexual child abuse. 88
Therefore, the Court of Special Appeals' theory as to relevance of the evidence excluded in Churchfield could
not have been that it was probative that the girl consented
to sex with her own father. Rather, the appellate court's
opinion was that the evidence was relevant to Christina's
credibility. In Wigmoresque tones, Judge Thieme wrote
that the young victim's alleged sex with her teenaged boyfriends was highly probative ofher "credibility, especially
about her sexual activities, and the extent to which she
would go to evade parental restrictions in that area,"89
and ofher "propensity to lie about sex. ''90 This language
rang false to many modern ears, including some at the

34.1 U. Bait. I.F. 7
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University ofBaltimore School of Law.
The Court of Special Appeals had in effect told
Christina that, even though the jury had found she had
been victimized, the jury had been duped. It seemed
to this author that the appellate court's clear message
to Christina was that she was not only unworthy of
beliefif she was sexually active, she was also unworthy of protection.
Unfortunately, many fifteen-year-olds are sexually active today.91 The Churchfield approach would
pennit impeachment ofeach ofthem in this manner if
they alleged sexual abuse.
Until Churchfield, this position would seem to
have been universally discredited since the 1970s.
As the reviser of Wigmore's treatise wrote in its 1983
edition:
§ 62. Character ofcomplainant in rape
and other sex crimes.
Wigmore argued strongly for the
admissibilityofcharacter forchastity and
unchastity in the prosecutions for sex
offenses against women, believing that
such evidence should be admitted on
the issue of the "credibility" of the
complainant. Wigmore had a deeprooted fear of baseless criminal
prosecutions instigated by women
having a psychological disposition ''to
imaginaIyand fulse charges" and plainly
thoughtthattheadmissibilityofcharacter
forunchastity was anecessazy safeguard
against the possibility of such
prosecutions. Wigmore's views were
shared by the men ofhis generation and
by the men ofthe following generation.
But times have changed, and quite
suddenly. In most states [including
Maryland, under art. 27, § 461A], the
assumption now prevails that character
for unchastity is inadmissible, in the
absence ofspecial Circumstances.92
What was particularly heartbreaking about
Churchfield was that it is well documented that victims of sexual child abuse, such as Christina (who had

34.1 U. Bait L.F. 8

been abused by her half-brother), often become promiscuous as a result of their loss of self-esteem due to the
abuse. 93 To require trial judges to permit their cross-examination as to their subsequent consensual acts is to
"blame the victim" and further destroy their hope of regaining control of their lives. In a terrible irony, the
Churchjield decision, making such children inherently
impeachable, made them "safer" targets for subsequent
adult sexual predators.

VII. University of Baltimore Group's
Response: Taking up the Cudgel
It is no wonder that when I met Davis Ruark, the
Wicomico County State's Attorney, at a Lower Eastern
Shore Bar educational event in November 200 1, he asked,
"What are we going to do about Churchfielcl?" Learning
that no one had plans to craft a legislative response, this
author (who was to be on sabbatical, writing, in spring
2002 and thus was freed from a class schedule) determined to take up the cause and invited my fall semester
Evidence students to help. Over the course of two years,
seven students valiantly gave their time and energy to this
law reform effort.94
Experienced lobbyists know the ropes oflegislative
procedures well. They also maintain a constant presence
in the Legislature. Would-be reformers without those luxuries rely on the good will of sympathetic legislators, private citizens, and public interest groups. We were fortunate to find many of each. Over the Christmas 2001
break, students llana Cohen, Christian Elkington, Michele
Payer, Carlotta Woodward, and John Maclean volunteered. They in turn solicited letters of support from other
students, including Anna Mantegna, who also traveled to
Annapolis to testify.
As things developed, we proposed two bills in the
January to April 2002 legislative session: one to overrule
Churchfield by amending the rape shield statute, and one
to overrule Cooksey by creating a crime in Maryland for
a continuing sexual offense against a child. The Cooksey/
continuing offense bill passed in 2002, and was signed
into law by Governor Parris N. Glendening. The
Churchfieldlrape shield bill passed both houses, in slightly
different forms, but was not taken up by a Conference
Committee, so failed. We vowed to return the next year.
In the 2003 session, Ilana Cohen, Anna Mantegna,
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and I returned, joined by first-year student Joyce
Lombardi. The rape shield bill passed this time, and was
signed into law by Governor Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr. The
participating students put their skills in analysis, research,
and persuasion to the test through lobbying and providing
oral and written testimony, emerging victorious. They are
well poised to continue their law reform efforts throughout their legal careers.
A. A Complicated Process: The 2002 Session
Over the 2001 Christmas break, I drafted a proposed amendment to the rape shield statute and worked
on obtaining sponsors and co-sponsors interested in overturning Churchfield. I met with then Delegate Kenneth
Montague, law partner of University ofBaltimore alumna,
and one of my former students, Gustie Taler. Delegate
Montague served on the Judiciary Committee, to which
the bill would be assigned, and as chair of its subcommittee onjuvenile law. He offered to sponsor the bill.
When I explained the history of the rape shield law
as intended to protect women from the unequal treatment
provided by the common law, he pulled out his copy of
Black's Law Dictionary and discovered that "chaste" had
a connotation referring only to females. 95 We agreed that
the bill should make the statute gender neutral. He proposed to do this by adding, after the word "chastity," the
gender-neutral phrase, "or prior sexual activity."
In the course ofour conversation, I mentioned that a
Wicomico County Assistant State's Attorney, Liz Ireland,
had identified Cooksey as a problem. Saying "in for a
penny, in for a pound," Delegate Montague said he would
sponsor a bill to correct that problem as well.

1. The Cooksey Bill
As Judge Wilner pointed out in Cooksey:
All ofthe courts are sympathetic to the plight
of both the young victims, often unable to
state except in the most general tenns when
the acts were committed, and ofprosecutors,
either hampered by the lack of specific
information or, when it is reported that the
conduct occurred dozens or hundreds of
times over a significant period, faced with
the practical problem ofhow to deal with

such a multitude ofoffenses. The courts are
all also properly concerned with the rights
of defendants, who go to trial with a
presumption of innocence, and with the
ramifications to them of duplicitous
pleading.96
Judge Wilner quoted the highest court of Rhode Island as having acknowledged that: "'reconceptualization
of child sexual assault as a continuing course of conduct
crime would eliminate duplicity problems in charging these
offenses, '" but concluded, along with Rhode Island's court,
that the creation of such a crime was for the legislature,
not the court. 97
The Court ofAppeals in Cooksey thus invited the
General Assembly to act to create a continuing sexual offense statute, as had been done by the legislatures in New
York and California, if it deemed it desirable: "New York
and California attempted to deal with the problem by statute, allowing the legislative branch, after public hearings,
to weigh all ofthe competing interests and concerns and
strike a proper balance. That avenue, of course, is open
in Maryland. "98 I learned that two bills (H.B. 939, sponsored by Del. Grosfeld, and H.B. 156, sponsored by Del.
Kelly) had been submitted the previous year to overturn
Cooksey, but they were not passed by the House Judiciary Committee. We reviewed those bills, and Christian
set about researching the other states' laws, referenced
by Judge Wilner in Cooksey, that recognized crimes of
continuing sexual offenses against children. Using those
states' statutes, from New York99 and California, 100 as well
asArizona's statute, and case law upholding their constitutionality, we arrived at a draft that seemed to take the best from
those models.
We proposed recognition of a felony for committing, over a period of ninety days or more, three or more
sexual acts against a child under the age offourteen and
proposed that it be punishable by up to thirty years imprisonment.10 1 To support a conviction, a jury would need
only to agree that the defendant committed three or more
such acts; ifmore than three were charged, the jurors would
not have to be unanimous as to which three the defendant
committed. The draft was supported by a fact sheet summarizing the applicable case law from other states, as well
as Maryland's. llana, Christian, and I met in Annapolis
34.1 U. Bait. L.F. 9
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with Delegate Montague and his legislative aide, "Brother
Frank," a kind and gifted fonner Catholic school principal
who in mid-life switched gears to law school and a career
in law. Delegate Montague submitted the draft to Legislative Reference, which made some nonsubstantive
changes.
With our own phone calls and the leadership of Delegate Montague and Brother Frank, as well as the lobbying support of Ellen Mugmon, we added co-sponsors:
Delegates Sharon Grosfeld (Chair of the Judiciary
Committee's subcommittee on criminal law), Ann Marie
Doory (vice-chair ofthe Judiciary Committee), and Judiciary Committee members William Cole and Michael
Dobson to what had emerged from Legislative Reference
as H.B. 1302. I submitted written testimony in support of
the bill, using Christian's research (showing that similar
statutes in other jurisdictions have been upheld as constitutional),102 to support its constitutionality, and obtained
promises from Assistant State's Attorneys John Cox of
Baltimore County, Tonia Belton-Gofreed of Prince
George's County, and Liz Ireland ofWicomico County to
testify in person at the bill hearings. Other supporting witnesses were Bobbi Seabolt ofthe American Academy of
Pediatrics and Ellen Mugmon ofthe State Council on Child
Abuse and Neglect. Attorney General J. Joseph Curran,
Jr., Coalition to Protect Maryland's Children, Citizens Review Board for Children, Inc., and American Academy of
Pediatrics submitted written testimony in support of the
bill.
At the committee hearings, Ted Wieseman of the
Public Defender's Office and Lia Young testified against
the bill, particularly the length ofthe maximum sentence.
Yet, one argument that proved helpful for us as proponents was that, in the absence of Maryland's recognition
of such an offense, prosecutors had to charge mUltiple
counts of rape or other sex crimes,103 and were sometimes obtaining sentences of over 100 years. Placing this
crime on the books would give the prosecutors a more
appropriate option (although they need not avail themselves of it). 104
H.B. 1302 - the "Cooksey bill" - passed the House
Committee, then the House; the Senate Committee, then
the Senate; and was signed into law by Governor
Glendening. It became effective on October 12,2002,
and is codified as Section 3-315 ofthe Criminal Law Ar-

34.1 U. Bait L.R 10

ticle of the Maryland Code. lOS
2. The Churchfield Bill
In the Senate, we obtained Senator Perry Sfikas'
agreement to be the chief sponsor of the rape shield bill.
Senator Philip Jimeno agreed to co-sponsor the bill. The
Committee Chainnan, Senator Walter Baker, was also
highly supportive. I previously had the pleasure of working with all three ofthem on other legislation.
Our draft of the Churchfield bill was pre-filed and
sent to Legislative Reference for numbering and for conformity in style with other bills. The rape shield bills became Senate Bill 212 and House Bill 1067. The House
Bill was sponsored by Delegate Montague and co-sponsored by Delegates Ann Marie Doory, Sharon Grosfeld,
Bill Cole, Pauline Menes, Cannen Amedori, and Tim
Hutchins. Legislative Reference rewrote the purpose
clause, leaving our statements of intent on the cutting room
floor. In light ofthe fact that the Criminal Law Article 27 of
the Annotated Code was being recodified, Legislative
Reference also confonned the bill to the new sections of
the pending criminal law Article. 106
As with the Cooksey bill, we prepared fact sheets,
written testimony, and letters (submitted individually by
Anna, Christian, Hana, John, and myself) in support ofthe
Churchfieldbill. We made three main arguments:
• In order to provide equal protection to
all victims of sexual crimes, regardless of
which particular sexual crime goes to trial,
Art. 27, § 461A must be amended to extend
to all victims ofall sex crimes. In order
to be sure that the rape shield law is not
circwnvented, its protection also must extend
to charges oflesser included crimes, such
as simple assault.
• Part ofthe cmrentlegislative initiative is to
make clear that the General Assembly
strongly and unequivocally rejects the
Wigmore view that a female is unworthy of
beliefbecause sheisnot a virgin or is sexually
active. Moreover, it extends that same
protection to male victims by adding the
gender-neutral phrase "or prior sexual
activity."
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• The bill thus corrects two significant,
historical omissions by providing for equal
protectionfor not only young victims and
adult victims, but also equal protection for
male victims andfemale victims. I07
We found support for this initiative to be widespread.
Written testimony was also provided byrnany other groups
and individuals in 2002:
State Council on Child Abuse and Neglect
Citizens' Review Board for Children
The House of Ruth
The Women's Law Center of Maryland
Deputy State's Attorney for Prince George's
County, Robert L. Dean
Prevent Child Abuse Maryland
ClinicallForensic Social Worker in Office of
State's Attorney for Baltimore City, ShannonB.
Wood
University of Baltimore School of Law Family Law
Association President Dawn Anderson
American Academy of Pediatrics
Women Legislators ofMaryland
David Flemmer, Psy.D., Ph.D., child psychiatrist
Robb Longman, Esq.
University of Baltimore law studentsAdam MmKer
and Rue Stewart
Oral testimony was also provided in 2002 by:
Baltimore County Assistant State's Attorney John
Cox, Chief of Child Abuse and Sex Offense
Division
Wicomico County State's Attorney Davis Ruark
and Assistant State's Attorney Angela Di Pietro
Frederick County Deputy State's Attorney Charles
Smith
Ellen Mugmon, State Council on Child Abuse and
Neglect
Charlie Cooper, Citizens' Review Board for
Children
Bobbie Steyer, The House of Ruth
Bobbi Seabolt, American Academy of Pediatrics
Gloria Goldfaden, Prevent Child Abuse Maryland

Opponents were Angela Shelton, Larry Rogers, and
Ted Wieseman of the Public Defender's Office. Before
the House Judiciary Committee, Terry Rogers ofthe Public
Defender's Office questioned the meaning ofthe genderneutral phrase "or other sexual activity."
John Maclean, home in Illinois over Christmas break,
had found that Illinois' rape shield statute applied to protect sexual child abuse victims. 108 Back in Baltimore, he
wrote an op-ed piece for The Daily Record, supporting
the bill. I09 Joe Surkiewicz wrote a news article about our
efforts. I \0
The bill passed the Senate as introduced. But, in
response to the Public Defender's issue, the House Committee substituted the phrase "or abstinence" for the phrase
"or prior sexual activity," though this change was not intended to have any different substantive effect, and the bill
passed the House with that amendment, on the last day of
the session. The bill was not taken up in Conference.
Because it did not pass both houses in identical form, the
bill failed. llana, Anna, and I vowed to go back the next
year and try again. On May 14, 2002, Christian, llana,
and I appeared on WCBM's Court Talk, with Harold
Dwin, to talk about the bill and our hopes for the next
session.
B. The 2003 Session

With the leadership of Ellen Mugmon, a tireless child
advocate and member ofthe State Council on Child Abuse
and Neglect, we saw our Churchfield topic on the list to
be considered in fall 2002 as part ofthe Women's Legislative Agenda for 2003. Anna and I attended that group's
meeting on October 6,2002. We met with several legislators, including Delegate Liz Bobo and Senator Delores
Kelley. I made an oral presentation.
We were pleased to learn later that the bill was
adopted as one of the group's top four legislative priorities. We also netted the help of Maryland Citizens Against
Sexual Assault, and its lawyer-lobbyist, Lisae Jordan, who
volunteered to be the lead contact on the bill for the
Women's Legislative Agenda
The redistricting and the 2002 elections had lost us
several of our sponsors and supporters, including Senators Sfikas and Baker and Delegates Montague and Cole.
Delegate Grosfeld was elected to the Senate and Delegate Doory moved to another committee in the House.
34.1 U. Bait. L.F. 11
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Delegate Montague was appointed by Governor Ehrlich
to be the Secretary of Juvenile Services. But again, we
were fortunate. llana, first-year evening student Joyce
Lombardi, and I met with Delegate Pauline Menes, who
agreed to be our lead sponsor in the House, and with
Senator Jennie Forehand, who agreed to be the lead sponsor in the Senate. Our sponsors submitted the bill as it
had passed the House in 2002; it became numbered S.B.
453 in the Senate and H.B. 196 in the House.
S.B. 453 was sponsored by Senator Forehand and
co-sponsored by Senators Jim Brochins, Ulysses Currie,
Brian Frosh (new chair ofthe Judicial Proceedings Committee), Rob Garagiola, Leo Green, Sharon Grosfeld,
Paula Hollinger, Nancy Jacobs, Phil Jimeno, Delores
Kelley, Gloria Lawlah, Thomas Middleton, and Leonard
Teitelbaum.
H.B. 196 was sponsored by Delegate Menes and
co-sponsored by Delegates Joanne Benson, David
Boschert, Bennett Bozman, Anthony Brown, Joan
Cadden, Jon Cardin, Mary Conroy, Steven DeBoy, Sr.,
Ann Marie Doory, Don Dwyer, Adelaide Eckardt, Barbara Frush, Tawanna Gaines, Marilyn Goldwater, Tim
Hutchins, Mary-Dulany James, Sally Jameson, Darryl
Kelley, Kevin Kelly, Nancy King, Ruth Kirk, Susan Lee,
Mary Ann Love, Richard Madaleno, Jr., Salima Marriott,
Brian Moe, Karen Montgomery, Dan Morhaim, Shirley
Nathan-Pulliam, Doyle Niemann, Rosetta Parker, Obie
Patterson, Carol Petzold, Neil Quinter, Justin Ross, Luiz
Simmons, Ted Sophocleus, Veronica Turner, House Judiciary Chairman Joe Vallario, and Bobby Zirkin.
I met with Chairman Vallario and counsel to the
House Judiciary Committee to discuss the bill. llana,
Joyce, Anna, Lisae Jordan, and Ellen Mugmon met with
numerous legislators and talked up the bill, as did Senator
Forehand and her legislative aide, Maureen Reynolds, Delegate Menes and her aide, Grace Mary Brady.
In response to the questions raised during the meetings with individual legislators, llana set about delving into
the legislative history ofthe original rape shield statute and
each ofits prior amendments. This endeavor entailed many
hours spent poring over microfiche in the General
Assembly's Annapolis library. Joyce used the Internet to
research other states' rape shield laws. She discovered
that Maryland's and Georgia's were the only two not to
cover all sex offenses: Georgia's does not apply to sexual
34.1 U. Bait L.F. 12

battery or aggravated sexual battery, although it does apply to sexual child abuse. I I I
Written testimony in support ofthe bills was submitted not only by us, but also by:
Maryland Family Violence Council, Attorney
General J. Joseph Curran, Jr.
House ofRuth, Dorothy Lennig
Maryland Network Against Domestic Violence
Maryland Commission on Women
League of Women Voters
Maryland Coalition Against Sexual Assault
University of Baltimore Center for Families,
Olllchm,am theCour1s
Maryland State's Attorney's Association, by Sue
Schenning, Deputy State'sAttorney for Baltimore
County
State Council on Child Abuse and Neglect
Citizens' Review Board for Children
Prevent Child Abuse Maryland
Women's Law Center of Maryland
Glenn Ivey, State's Attorney for Prince George's
County
American Association ofUniversity Women
Maryland Jewish Alliance
Family Law Association, student group,
University ofBaltimore School of Law
Joseph Mantegna, retired police officer, Baltimore
City
Robb Longman, Esq.
David Flemmer, Psy.D., Ph.D., child
psychiatrist, Student Services, Montgomery
County Public Schools
University of Baltimore School of Law students
Brendan 0' Connell, Thomas Merrill, Jennifer
Merrill, Rue Stewart, Sheila Garrity, and
Lawrence Katz
Oral testimony other than ours and the sponsors' was
provided by:
Baltimore County Assistant State's Attorney Sue
Hazlett, Child Abuse and Sex Offense Division,
Chair ofMaryland State's Attorneys' Association's
Child Abuse Subcommittee
Ellen Mugmon, State Council on Child Abuse and
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Neglect
Lisae Jordan, MCASA
Claude de Vastey, Women's Bar Association
Cynthia Golomb, Maryland Network Against
Domestic Violence
I wrote an op-ed piece for The Daily Record 112 and
Joyce contacted various news reporters and wrote letters
to the editor of The Baltimore Sun.
S.B. 453 passed both Committees and both Houses,
was signed by Governor Ehrlich, and went into effect
October 1, 2003. 113 The 2003 bill protects child abuse
victims to the same extent as adult victims, and male victims as much as female victims. Opinion evidence or reputation evidence as to a victim's sexual orientation will now
be precluded. 114 But the statute does not preclude the
prosecution from presenting evidence ofthe victim's prior
specific acts or the absence thereof 115
VITI. Conclusion
The University of Baltimore law students who participated in reforming Maryland's criminal law by the adoption of the Cooksey bill, H.B. 1302, in 2002 and the rape
shieldiChurchfieldbill, S.B. 453, in 2003 should be proud,
as should all the dedicated public servants, including fonner
Delegate Montague, Senator Forehand, and Delegate
Menes, who led the fight for their passage. May the good
works ofall continue.
Appendix A
The "Cooksey Bill," H.B. 1302, enacted in 2002,
and codified at Md. Crim. L. Code Ann. § 3-315 reads:

§ 3-315. Continuing course of conduct with child.
(a) Prohibited. - A person may not engage in a
continuing course ofconduct which includes three or more
acts that would constitute violations of § 3-303, § 3-304,
§ 3-305, § 3-306, or § 3-307 [rape in the first degree,
rape in the second degree, sexual offense in the first degree, sexual offense in the second degree, or sexual offense in the third degree] ofthis subtitle over a period of
90 days or more, with a victim who is under the age of14
years at any time during the course of conduct.
(b) Penalty. - (1) A person who violates this sec-

tion is guilty of a felony and on conviction is subject to
imprisonment not exceeding 30 years.
(2) A sentence imposed under this section may be
separate from and consecutive to or concurrent with a
sentence under § 3-602 [sexual abuse ofaminor] of this
title.
(c) Determination. - In determining whether the
required number of acts occurred in violation of this section, the trier of fact:
(1) must determine only that the required number of
acts occurred; and
(2) need not determine which acts constitute the required number of acts.
(d) Merger. - (1) A person may not be charged with
a violation of § 3-303, § 3-304, § 3-305, § 3-306, or §
3-307 ofthis subtitle involving the same victim in the same
proceeding as a violation of this section unless the other
violation charged occurred outside the time period charged
under this section.
(2) A person may not be charged with a violation of
§ 3-303, § 3-304, § 3-305, § 3-306, or § 3-307 of this
subtitle involving the same victim unless the violation
charged occurred outside the time period charged under
this section.
AppendixB
The "Churchfield Bill," S.B. 453, enacted in2003,
amended as shown, Md. Crim. L. CodeAnn. § 3-3 19, reads:

Sexual Offenses - Reputation and Opinion
Evidence and Evidence of Sexual ConductAdmissibility

Article-Criminal Law § 3-319
FOR the purpose ofapplying to sexual crimes against
both males and females, the sexual abuse of a minor, the
sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult, and lesser included
crimes a prohibition against admitting in a prosecution reputation and opinion evidence relating to a victim's chastity
or abstinence; applying to sexual crimes against both males
and females, the sexual abuse ofa minor, the sexual abuse
of a vulnerable adult, and lesser included crimes and au-
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thorization for admitting in a prosecution under certain circwnstances a specific instance of a victim's sexual conduct; making a technical change; and generally relating to
admissibility ofreputation and opinion evidence and evidence of sexual contact.
(a) Evidence relating to a victim's reputation for chastity OR ABSTINENCE and opinion evidence relating to
a victim's chastity ORABSTINENCE may not be admitted in a prosecution for rape, a seKl:IaI offeBse iB the first
or sesoBe eegree, attemptee rape, or 8fI: attemptee se}{l:IaI
offense in the first or sesoBe eegree:(1) A CRIME SPECIFIED UNDER THIS SUBTITLE 3 ORALESSERINCLUDED CRIME; OR (2) THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF
A MINOR UNDER § 3-602 OF THIS TITLE OR A
LESSER INCLUDED CRIME; OR (3) THE SEXUAL
ABUSE OF A VULNERABLE ADULT UNDER § 3604 OF THIS TITLE OR A LESSER INCLUDED
CRIME.
(b) Evidence ofa specific instance ofa victim's prior
sexual conduct may be admitted in a prosecution tor rape,
a seJuial offeBse iB the first or sesoBe eegree, attemptee
rape, or an attempted SeJrnal offease iFl the fifst or sesooo
degree described in subsection (a) of this section only if
the judge finds that: (1) the evidence is relevant; (2) the
evidence is material t..') a fact in issue in the case; (3) the
inflammatory or prejudicial nature of the evidence does
not outweigh its probative value; and (4) the evidence:
(i) is ofthe victim's past sexual conduct with the defendant;
(ii) is ofa specific instance ofsexual activity showing
the source or origin of semen, pregnancy, disease, or
trauma;

(iii) supports a claim that the victim has an ulterior
motive to accuse the defendant ofthe crime; or
(iv) is offered for impeachment after the prosecutor
has put the victim's prior conduct in issue.
(c) (1) Evidence described in subsection (a) or (b)
of this section may not be referred to in a statement to a
jury or introduced in a trial unless the court has first held a
closed hearing 1:ll1der pamgraph (2) ofthis suesectioB and
determined that the eVIdence is admissible.
(2) The court may reconsider a ruling excluding the
evidence and hold an additional closed hearing if new information is discovered during the course ofthe trial that
may make the evidence admissible.

34.1 U. Bait L.F. 14

ENDNOTES
1. Professor of Law and Dean Joseph Curtis Faculty Fellow, University ofBaltimore School ofLaw; J.D.,
Duke University Law School, 1974; B.A., University of
Pennsylvania, 1971.
Lynn McLain was an associate in the litigation department at Piper and Marbury in Baltimore, a graduate
fellow at Duke University, and then in 1977 joined the
faculty at the University ofBaltimore School ofLaw, where
she teaches courses in evidence and copyright law. Professor McLain is admitted to the bars ofthe Court ofAppeals of Maryland (December 1974), the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland (March 1975)
and the United States Supreme Court (March 1990). In
addition, Professor McLain is the author of a three-volume treatise, Maryland Evidence: State and Federal,
as well as a book entitled Maryland Rules ofEvidence.
As a Special Reporter for the Rules Committee of the
Court ofAppeals of Maryland, she participated in drafting Maryland's rules of evidence.
2. At the time the pertinent statute was codified at
MD. ANN. CODE, art. 27, § 461A. It was recodified in
2002 as MD. CRIM. L. CODE ANN. § 3-319.
3. Churchfield v. State, 137 Md. App. 668, 769 A.2d
313 (2001).
4. Cooksey v. State, 359 Md. 1, 752 A.2d 606
(2000).
5. Child abuse, as defined by the Maryland statute,
may be committed only by "( 1) A parent or other person
who has permanent or temporary care or custody or responsibility for the supervision of a minor ... [or] (2) A
household member or family member" ofthe child. MD.
CRIM. L. CODE ANN. § 3-602(b) (Supp. 2003). Thus,
for example, a teacher who meets a young student at home
on the weekend and sexually abuses him would not commit child abuse. Cf Anderson v. State, 142 Md. App.
498, 790 A.2d 732 (2002) (act qualified as child sexual
abuse because teacher gave student ride to teacher's house
from school); 82 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. 97-017 (1997).
6. 1976 Md. Laws ch. 574 (codified as MD. ANN.
CODE, art. 27, § 461A). In 2002, section 461A was recodified as § 3-319 of the Criminal Law article of the
Maryland Annotated Code.
7. H.R. 4727. See Congo Rec. H11944 (Oct. 10,

=========================

Articles
1978); Congo Rec. S18579 (Oct. 12,1978).
8. See 124 Congo Rec. 34,913 (1978) (remarks of
Rep. Holtzman) ("Since rape trials become inquisitions
into the victim's morality, not trials ofthe defendant's innocence or guilt, it is not surprising that [rape] is the
least reported crime. It is estimated that as few as one in
ten rapes is ever reported.").
9. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 193 at 685 &
n.30 (5th ed. 1999) (citing collections of studies).
10. See 124 Congo Rec. 34,912 (1978) (remarks
of Rep. Mann) ("[F]or many years in this country, ...
[d]efense lawyers were permitted great latitude in bringing out intimate details about a rape victim's life. Such
evidence quite often serves no real purpose and only results in embarrassment to the rape victim and unwarranted
public intrusion with her private life."). See generally LYNN
McLAIN, 5 MARYLAND EVIDENCE: STATE AND FEDERAL
§§ 412:1-412:2 (2ded. 2001 & Supp. 2003)(citing numerous sources).
11. See generally Margaret Berger, Man s Trial,
Woman s Tribulation, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1977).
12. See not~s 3G·34 infra and accompanying text.
13. See 1 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §§ 62 & 200 (3d
ed. 1940) (admissibility ofevidence ofvictim's reputation
for unchastity is "generally conceded," though "many jurisdictions" prelude evidence ofher other specific acts of
unchastity; Wigmore argued for admissibility of specific
instances); 1A WIGMORE §§ 62-62.1 (rev. 1983).
14. Id. See, e.g., Humphreys V. State, 227 Md.
115, 121, 175 A.2d 777, 780 (1961); State V. Lucado,
40 Md. App. 25, 35-37, 389 A.2d 398,404-05 (1978).
15. FED. R. EVID. 412(a) (criminal and civil cases)
& (b)(2) (civil cases only); MD. CRIM. L. CODE. ANN.
§ 3-319(b)(ii)-(iv) (2002 ).
16. FED. R. EVID. 412; MD. CRIM. L. CODE ANN.
§ 3-319(a) (2002).
17. E.g., Wheelerv. State, 88 Md. App. 512,52728, 596A.2d 78, 86 (1991).
18. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(B); MD. CRIM. L. CODE
ANN. § 3-319(b)(i) (2002).
19. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(l)(A) & (C»; MD. CRIM.
L. CODE ANN. § 3-319(b)(ii)-(iv) (2002).
20. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(A); MD. CRIM. L. CODE
ANN. § 3-319(b)(ii) (2002) ("the source or origin of semen, pregnancy, disease, or trauma"). See United States

v. Bear Stops, 997 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1993) (reversible
error to exclude evidence that victim had been assaulted
by others on another occasion when offered to provide
alternative explanation for victim 's manifesting post-abuse
syndrome and for physical evidence).
21. DNA evidence can pinpoint the identity of the
individual whose blood, semen, hair, saliva, skin, etc. is
found on the victim. See generally John P. Cronan, The
Next Frontier of Law Enforcement: A Purpose for
Complete DNA Databanks, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 119,
121 (2000).
22. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(l)(C). See, e.g., Olden V.
Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988) (per curiam) (state trial
court committed reversible constitutional error when it
excluded evidence of a rape victim's cohabitation at the
time oftrial with the man to whom she reported the rape
[a man of another race than the victim, but of the same
race as the defendant]; the defense was consent, and the
defendant argued that the victim's relationship with her
boyfriend gave her a motive to lie).
23. MD~ CRIM. L. CODEANN. § 3-319(b)(iii) (2002)
(the evidence "supports a claim that the victim has an ulterior motive to accuse the defendant of the crime .... ").
See Johnson V. State, 332 Md. 456, 632A.2d 152 (1993)
(reversible error to exclude evidence that the victim admittedly had recently exchanged sex for drugs, when defense was that she had agreed to do so, but defendant
had failed to give her drugs).
24. MD. CRIM. L. CODE ANN. § 3-319(b) (2002).
See, e.g., White v. State, 324 Md. 626, 638-39, 598
A.2d 187, 193 (1991) (trial judge properly balanced probative value against prejudice; "Proffered evidence must
contain a direct link to the facts at issue in a particular
case before it can be admitted.").
25. FED. R. EVID. 412(c)(1); MD. CRIM. L. CODE
ANN. § 3-319(c) (2002).
The United States Supreme Court has upheld the
facial constitutionality ofthe similar notice and hearing requirements ofMichigan's rape-shield statute. Michigan V.
Lucas, 500 U.S. 145 (1991), on remand, 484 N. W.2d
685 (Mich. App. 1992), appeal after remand, 507 N. W.2d
5 (Mich. App. 1993). In that case, the Michigan Court of
Appeals had ruled that precluding a defendant (because
ofhis failure to give notice and to comply with other statutory requirements) from presenting evidence of his own

34.1 U. Bait. L.R 15

Articles
prior sexual conduct with the victim violated,per se, the
Sixth Amendment.
The Supreme Court majority reversed, but remanded
to the Michigan court to determine, first, whether its statute permitted preclusion and, second, whether preclusion
was constitutional under the facts of the particular case.
In reaching this resolution, the majority, in an opinion by
Justice O'Connor, recognized that "[t]he notice-and-hearing requirement selVes legitimate state interests in protecting
against surprise, harassment, and undue delay. Failure to
comply with this requirement may in some cases justify
even the severe sanction ofpreclusion." 500 U.S. at 15253.
Maryland's statute was upheld as constitutional in
Thomas v. State, 301 Md. 294, 483 A.2d 6 (1984).
26. See FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1 ) (evidence must be
"otherwise admissible under these rules," thus including,
by reference, FRE 403); MD. CRIM. L. CODE ANN. § 3319(b) (2002); Smith v. State, 71 Md. App. 165, 18190, 524 A.2d 117, 125-29 (1987) ("Whether evidence
of prior sexual contact will be admitted to explain, inter
alia, the presence of semen requires the trial court to determine whether the probative value ofthe evidence ofthe
victim's prior sexual contact substantially outweighs the
danger of undue prejudice. ").
27. FED. R. EVID. 412(c)(2); MD. CRIM. L. CODE
ANN. § 3-319(c) (2002). See Doe v. United States, 666
F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1981)(ifthe court orders evidence of
the victim's sexual conduct may be admitted at trial, the
victim has the right to an immediate appeal ofthat order).
28. MD. CRIM. L. CODE ANN. §§ 3-303(a)(1) and
3-304(a)(1) (2002) refer only to "vaginal intercourse."
29. See 1977 Md. Laws ch. 294 (adding prosecutions for a "sexual offense in the first or second degree");
1997 Md. Laws ch. 311 & 312 (adding prosecutions for
attempted rape and attempted sexual offenses in the first
or second degree).
30. Such reputation evidence was admissible on the
issue of consent. E.g., Caldwell v. State, 276 Md. 612,
349 A.2d 623 (1976); Giles v. State, 229 Md. 370,37980, 183 A.2d 359, 363 (1962), vacated & remanded
on other grounds, 386 U.S. 66 (1967); Humphreys v.
State, 227 Md. 115,121,175 A.2d 777, 780 (1961);
1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 193 at 681-82 (5th ed.
1999); lA WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 62 (rev. 1983).

31. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-115
(2002 Repl. Vol.) (originally enacted as MD. ANN. CODE,
art. 35, § 13C (1957».
32. See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 193 at 68182 & n.9 (5th ed. 1999) Gurisdictions were divided as to
whether proof by specific instances was permitted);
1 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §§ 62 & 200, supra note 13.
33.3 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 924a at 459-60 (3d
ed. 1940) (some emphasis in original, some added). See
also id. §§ 934a, 963, & 982; id. §§ 62 & 200.
34. Id. § 924b at 466 (emphasis added).
35. MD. CRIM. L. CODE ANN. § 3-319(b)(iii) (2002)
(previously MD. ANN. CODE, art. 27, § 461A(a)(3) (1996
Repl. Vol.». See Oldenv. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988)
(defendant's confrontation right violated by preclusion of
evidence that victim's affair with boyfriend created motive
for her to falsely claim rape); Johnson v. State, 332 Md.
456,632 A.2d 152 (1993) (abuse of discretion to exclude evidence ofvictim's having had sex with others in
exchange for crack cocaine - on dates prior to alleged
rape - when defense witnesses and defendant testified
that she had made such an arrangement with them, though
they failed to give her the drugs promised).
36. See State v. DeLawder, 28 Md. App. 212, 344
A.2d 446 (1975) (when the defense was that the victim
thought she was pregnant by another, and charged the
accused with rape in order to avoid disclosure of her having voluntarily had sexual intercourse, the Court ofSpecial Appeals held that exclusion of evidence that she did
have intercourse with others violated the defendant's right
of confrontation) (case was decided before rape shield
statute was enacted).
37.1977 Md. Laws ch. 294.
38. MD. CRIM. L. CODE ANN. § 3-305 (2002).
39.Id. § 3-306.
40.Id. § 3-301(e).
41. 1997 Md. Laws. ch. 311 & 312.
42. See MD. CRIM. L. CODEANN. §§ 3-304 through
3-312, 3-321 through 3-323, 3-602, and 3-604 (2002
& Supp. 2003). See also Starkey v. State, 147 Md.
App. 700, 810 A.2d 542 (2002) (defendant was convicted ofthird-degree sexual offense for receiving fellatio
from the young victim; statute prohibiting lesser crime of
perverted sexual practices, including but not limited to
fellatio did not control, so as to preclude conviction for

34.1 U. Bait L.E 16 = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =

Articles
third-degree sexual offense); Jennifer McMenamin, Rape
Charges Added to Child Sex Abuse Case of Former
Carroll Schools Superintendent, BALT. SUN, Mar. 7,
2003, at 2B, col. 5 (defendant indicted for second-degree
rape, in addition to charges of "two counts of sexual child
abuse, third- and fourth-degree sex offenses, and one count
of second-degree assault"); Jason Song & Jonathan D.
Rockoff, Dundalk Teacher Charged in Sex Crime, BALT.
SUN, Jan. 9,2003, at2B, col. 5 (defendant charged with
"second-, third-, and fourth-degree sex offenses, possession of child pornography and filming a child in a pornographic act").
43. Davenport v. State, 89 Md. App. 517, 598 A.2d
827 (1991).
44. Churchfield v. State, 137 Md. App. 668, 769
A.2d 313 (2001).
45.Id. at 673, 769 A.2d at 316.
46.Id.
47.Id.
48.Id.
49.Id. at 674, 769 A.2d at 316.
50.Id.
51. Id.
52. Id., 769A.2dat316-17.
53. Ms. Di Pietro is a University ofBaltimore School
ofLaw alumna
54.Id. at 677-78 & n.2, 769A.2dat319. Christina
testified that the first incident of vaginal intercourse occurred in January or February 1999 and that the last incident occurred during the first week of January 2000, but
"she could not say how many times it happened." Id. at
673-74, 769 A.2d at 316.
55. Cooksey v. State, 359 Md. 1, 752 A.2d 606
(2000).
56.Id. at 3, 752 A.2d at 607.
57.Id. at 3-4, 752 A.2d at 607.
58.Id. at 17,22-23, 752 A.2d at 614-15,617-18.
The Court ofAppeals, in a unanimous decision authored
by Judge WIlner, held that the counts for second- and thirddegree sexual offenses had to be dismissed as duplicitous,
because under MD. ANN. CODE, art. 27, §§ 464AandB,
they are "single act" crimes. 359 Md. at6, 352A.2d at
608. Convictions under those sections would be valid only
if the jurors unanimously agreed that the defendant had
committed the same single act proscribed.

As those counts had been alleged, jurors could potentially return a guilty verdict if some ofthem agreed that
the defendant committed the sexual conduct on, for example, August 23 and others found that he had done so on
October 13. Such a jury verdict would violate the rule of
juror unanimity. It also would not disclose to the judge
how many, ifany, offenses on which the jury agreed, which
could be pertinent to sentencing. Finally, a mistrial for a
hungjury could not lead to a new trial without violating
double jeopardy principles, because it might be that the
first jury had believed that the defendant did not commit
one or more ofthe alleged multiple acts.
Therefore, the charging of "separate criminal acts,
committed not as part of a single continuing incident but
over an extended period of time, to form a singular continuing crime" was not pennissible under §§ 464A or 464B.
359 Md. at 17, 769 A.2d at 614-15.
59.Id. The Court ofAppeals held that child "[a]buse,
as defined in [MD. ANN. CODE, art. 27,] § 35C is ... a
crime that can be committed both by a single act and
through a continuing course of conduct consisting ofmultiple acts." 359 Md. at 23-24, 752 A.2d at 617-18.
60. See id. at 4-5, 23-24, 352A.2d at 607-08, 61718.
61. Telephone conversations ofauthor with Elizabeth
Ireland, Esq., Dec. 20, 2001, andAngelaDi Pietro, Esq.,
Jan. 3,2002; Churchfield, 137 Md. App. at 677-78 &
n.2, 769 A.2d at 319 & n.2.
62. Churchfield, 137 Md. App. at 673, 769 A.2d
at 316.
63. Testimony ofAngela Di Pietro before the House
Judiciary Committee, Annapolis, Md., Mar. 6, 2002;
Churchfield, 137 Md. App. at 681,769 A.2d at 320-21.
64. Churchfield, 137 Md. App. at 680, 769 A.2d
at 320.
65. Id. at 676-82, 769 A.2d at 318-21.
66.Id. at 681, 769 A.2d at 321.
67.Id. at 680-81, 769 A.2d at 320.
68. Id. at 675, 769 A.2d at 317.
69. Id. at 674, 676, 769 A.2d at 317.
70.Id.
71. !d. at 685-86, 769 A.2d at 323.
72. !d. at 676-81, 769 A.2d at 318-20.
73. See 5 LYNN McLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE:
STATE AND FEDERAL § 403:1 (2d ed. 2001) (citing, e.g.,

34.1 U. Bait. L.E 17

Articles
Lyba v. State, 321 Md. 564, 570-71, 583 A.2d 1033,
1036 (1991)).
74. See 6 LYNN McLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE:
STATE AND FEDERAL §611:2 at 583-86 & nn. 3 and 5 (2d
ed. 2001 & Supp. 2003) (citing, e.g., Coleman v. State,
321 Md. 586, 609, 583 A.2d 1044, 1055 (1991)).
75. Churchfield, 137 Md. App. at 673, 769 A.2d
at316.
76. Id. at 676, 769 A.2d at 317.
77.Id. at 672, 769 A.2d at 316.
78.Id. at 672,687-89, 769 A.2d at 316,324-25.
In a prescient comment, Judge Thieme wrote for the panel:
"We recognize that our holding today might concern strong
advocates for the rights ofvictims ofchild abuse and other
crimesofasexualnature." Id. at 695, 769A.2dat329.
79. E.g., Smith v. State, 145 Md. App. 400,434,
805 A.2d 1108, 1128 (2002) (Eyler, J., dissenting,joined
by Murphy, C.J., D. Eyler, Krauser, and Greene, JJ.).
80. Churchfield, 137 Md. App. at 696, 769 A.2d
at 329.
81. Telephone conversation ofAngela Di Pietro,
Esq., with author, Jan. 3,2002; testimonyofAngelaDi
Pietro, Esq. before the House Judiciary Committee, Mar.
6, 2002, Annapolis, Md.
82.Id. See MD. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN. § 11-701
(2002) (establishing registration procedure).
83. Telephone conversation of the author with Angela Di Pietro, Esq. (Jan. 3,2002).
84. Churchfield, 137 Md. App. at 677-78, 769
A.2d at 318-19.
85. See notes 28 and 50 supra and accompanying
text.
86. Written testimony of Ilana Cohen and Anna
Mantegna (on file with author).
87. FED. R. EVID. 401, 402; MD. RULES 5-401, 5402.
88. The statute does not require that the act be
against the will of, or without the consent of, the victim.
See Mo. CRIM. L. CODE ANN. § 3-602 (Supp. 2003).
Cf Owens v. State, 352 Md. 663, 687-90, 724 A.2d
43,55-56 (1999) (Maryland's statutory rape law is a flat
prohibition of certain sexual conduct regardless of
defendant's intent to violate law and regardless ''whether
the victim purported to consent"), cert. denied, 527 U.S.
1012 (1999); Lusby v. State, 217 Md. 191, 141 A.2d

34.1 U. Bait L.F. 18

893 (1958) (sexually abused daughter was victim of father, not his accomplice in incestuous relationship); Taylor
v. State, 214 Md. 156, 133 A.2d414 (1957) Guvenile's
consent no defense in sodomy case). See generally Wayne
Lafave, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 6.5(a) (2d ed.
2003) (because crime is against society, consent by a victim is generally not a defense to a criminal prosecution;
rape is an exception to this general rule).
89. Churchfield, 137 Md. App. at 682, 769 A.2d
at 321.
90.Id. at 686, 769 A.2d at 324.
91. Karen S. Peterson, Sexually Active Teens are
Often Clueless; May Lack Basic Knowledge about Disease, Birth Control, USA TODAY, May 20, 2003, atD.08.
92. lA WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 62 (Tillers rev.,
1983) (emphasis added).
93. Jennie G Noll, et ai., A Prospective Investigation of the Impact of Childhood Sexual Abuse on the
Development ofSexuality, 71 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 575, 582 (2003). See also Written Testimonyof David Flemmer, Psy.D., Ph.D., provided to the
House Judiciary Committee, Annapolis, Md., Feb. 11,
2003 (stating that sexual abuse may arouse a compulsive
yearning for giving and receiving sexual pleasure because
ofthe conditioning ofinappropriate sexual activity).
94. Those students were Ilana Cohen, J.D., May
2003; Christian Elkington, J.D., December 2002; Joyce
Lombardi, J.D. expected May 2006; John Maclean, J.D.,
May 2003; Anna Mantegna, J.D., May 2003; Michele
Payer~ J.D., May 2003; and Carlotta Woodward, J.D.,
May 2003. The author also wishes to thank Steve
Goldberg, J.D. expected May 2004, who contributed his
research assistance for this article.
95. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 214 (5th ed., 1979)
provides:
Chaste. Never voluntarily having had unlawful
sexual intercourse. An unmarried woman who has bad no
carnal knowledge of men. Newv. State, 141 Tex. erim.
536, 148 S.W.2d 1099, 1101 (1941).
See also Lucado v. State, 40 Md. App. 25, 389
A.2d 398 (1978) (evidence that male victim's reputation
that he was not homosexual - offered to rebut male
defendant's testimony that victim had "'started messing
around with [him]'" - did not relate to his "chastity" and
therefore was not excluded by the rape shield statute). In

Articles
Lucado, the Court of Special Appeals relied on legislative
history ofthe 1976 and 1977 acts, as well as on Webster's
Dictionary, and legal precedent. Judge Wilner, writing for
the panel, explained: "In the law, these terms [' chaste' and
'chastity'] have been traditionally used with particular reference to women; indeed, they have been associated with
nearly every vestige ofthe different, and generally unequal,
treatment of men and women by the law." Id. at 34-35 &
nn. 7-9; 389 A.2d at 403-04 & nn. 7-9.
96. Cooksey, 359 Md. at 18-19, 752A.2dat615.
97. Id. at 19, 752A.2dat616.
98.Id. at 27, 752 A.2d at 620.
99. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.75 (McKinney 1997 &
Supp. 2001).
100. CAL. PENAL CODE § 288.5 (West 1999). Christianalso located ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 13-1417 (2001) and
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 948.025 (West 2001) as additional
models for such statutes.
10 1. In comparison, maximum penalties for "one act"
sexual offenses are as follows:
Then Art. 27, § 464 (nowCrim. L. § 3-305): Firstdegree sexual offense (sexual act using dangerous weapon,
suffocation, strangulation, disfigurement, serious physical
injury, or such threats, including the threat ofkidnapping or
murder to victim or another known to the victim.; or aided
by another person(s); or in connection with burglary): life
(unless defendant has previously been convicted of this
crime offirst-degree rape, or unless victim was a child under sixteen and defendant was also convicted under § 338
[kidnapping], then life without parole) (same penalty as
rape in the first degree, now § 3-303).
Then § 464A (now § 3-306): Second-degree sexual
offense (sexual act without consent by force or threat of
force; or with mentally or physically incapacitated victim;
or with victim under fourteen and defendant at least four
years older than victim): twenty years (same penalty as
rape in the second degree, now § 3-304).
Then § 464B (now § 3-307): Third-degree sexual
offense (sexual contact [defined differently from "sexual
act"] under same conditions as first-degree or second-degree sexual offense, or vaginal intercourse [defined separately from "sexual act"] by a twenty-one- year-old or older

with a person fourteen or fifteen years old): ten years.
Then § 464C (now § 3-308): Fourth-degree sexual
offense (sexual contact without consent; or sexual act
[not aided and abetted by another person] when victim is
fourteen or fifteen and defendant is at least four years older
than victim; or sexual act or vaginal intercourse with a
victim who is fourteen or fifteen and defendant is at least
four years older than victim [unless defendant was at least
twenty-one, in which case it is third-degree sexual offense]):
one year or $1,000 or both.
Then § 461(e) (now § 3-301(e)): "Sexual act"
means cunnilingus, fellatio, analingus, anal intercourse, or
penetration by an object into another person's genital
opening or anus reasonably construed to be for sexual
arousal, gratification, or abuse. (Vaginal intercourse is covered separately, in rape statutes: § 3-303, first degree [life
or life without parole] and § 3-304, second degree [twenty
years].).
Then § 461(f) (now§ 3-301(f)): "Sexualcontact"
means intentional touching ofvictim or defendant's genital
andlor other intimate area (other than by penis, mouth, or
tongue) for purposes of sexual arousal, gratification, or
abuse.
The crime of sexual child abuse (then § 35C, now
§ 3-602) has a maximum sentence of twenty-five years,
whether for one instance or for many instances proved
under the same count. The crime of a continuing course
of sexual conduct with a child, set forth in Appendix A,
has a maximum sentence of thirty years. MD. CRIM. L.
CODE ANN. § 3-301 et seq. (2002 & Supp. 2003).
102. People v. Adames, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 631, 54
Cal. App. 4th 198 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); People v.
Calloway, 176 Misc. 2d 161,672 N.Y.S.2d 638 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1998); State v. Molitor, 210 Wis. 2d 415, 565
N. W.2d 248 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
103. Precedent for this approach can be found in
State v. Mulkey, 316 Md. 475, 560A.2d 24 (1989). In
Mulkey, the Court ofAppeals reversed the dismissal of
an indictment. The Court held that the State's charges
may well have been alleged with the requisite "reasonable
particularity," when each of twelve different, specific sexual
34.1 U. Bait. L.F. 19

Articles
offense counts charged only one offense, but as having
occurred between June 1 and September 3,5, or 6. The
trial court was directed, on remand, to consider certain
factors:
In a sexual offense case involving a child victim, the
trial court's determination as to how "reasonably particular" a charging document should be as to the time ofthe
offense should include [among other things] the following
relevant considerations: 1) the nature of the offense; 2)
the age and maturity ofthe child; 3) the victim's ability to
recall specific dates; and 4) the State's good faith efforts
and ability to determine reasonable dates." Id. at 488,
560 A.2d at 30.
104. See People v. Johnson, 40 Cal. App. 4th 24,
46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 836 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (prosecutor
was not required to charge under continuous course of
conduct statute, rather than ten counts of lewd act on
child).
105.2002 Md. Laws ch. 26, § 12; ch. 278, § 2.
See Appendix A.
106. H.B. 1067 and S.B. 212, which were identical.
107. Fact Sheet, p.2, submitted by this author, 2002
legislative session (on file with author).
108. ILL. REv. STAT. 1985, ch. 38, ~~ 115-17.
109. John Mac1ean,A Shield/or Minors, Too, THE
DAILY RECORD, Mar. 23, 2002, at 2B, col. 3.
110. Joe Surkiewicz, Fixing a Hole in the Shield,
THE DAILY RECORD, Ma r. 23, 2002, at 1B, col. 2.
111. Stinson v. State, 256 Ga. App. 902, 904, 569
S.E.2d 858,861 (2002).
112. Lynn McLain, Law Must Protect Child Victims, THE DAILY RECORD, Jan. 11,2003.
113. 2003 Md. Laws ch. 89. See Appendix B,
supra.
114. With regard to similar results in Arkansas and
Illinois, see Logan v. Lockhart, 994 F.2d 1324,1330-31
(8th Cir. 1993 ) (trial court's application ofArkansas law
to exclude evidence ofmale rape victim's past homosexual
activity as irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative
was not violation of due process); State v. Campos, 507
N.E.2d 1342 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (male child victim; rape
shield statute applicable).
On the subject of male rape, see generally Nicholas

34.1 U. Bait L.R 20

Burgess, Male Rape: Offenders and Victims, 137 AM.
1. PSYCHIATRY 806 (1980).
115. See MD. CRIM. L. CODE ANN. § 3-319(b)(4)(iv)
(Supp. 2003) (permitting impeachment "after the prosecutor has put the victim's prior sexual conduct in issue").

